Achieving democracy in the Middle East has never been an easy process, and those nations, like Israel, that have achieved it have only done so through constant conflict and with great support from other nations, in this case the United States.

A large part of the problem for achieving democracy (and peace) in this region has to do with the founding principles of the various nations, and their sense of identity. In the West, although we operate from a predominantly Christian religious standard, this has become secondary, as far as governance and politics is concerned, to secular interests and the idea of a pluralistic and tolerant state.

Western states find their identities not based on a shared ethnic or religious origin, but rather on the basis of current geographical location and a set of principles which define the character of the state. When religion conflicts with the constitution in a Western democracy, the constitution wins. In the Middle East, notions of religious and ethnic identity are paramount, and the powerful force of political culture makes the introduction of democratic ideals far more difficult.

There are two very important concepts that are absolutely essential, political culture and communalism. Political Culture is the idea that our attitudes and values inevitably affect how we act, and it is the same with politics. The functioning of political institutions at least partially reflect the attitudes, norms, and expectations of the citizenry.

Communalism is a catchall term that refers to identities defined by some combination of relatively fixed ethnolinguistic or sectarian distinctions. In the Middle East, Arab and Muslim identities, and some mix of the two, are the majority communal identities that propel politics throughout most nations in the region. As a result, religious issues take over government, as one would expect. After all, the highest goals of religions are not to ensure people to have freedom, equality, and justice. Rather, the goal would be to encourage people to live according to the doctrines of the religion, in order to be closer to God, and in order to achieve salvation.

This line of reasoning does not lend itself well to tolerance or acceptance of diversity, and democracy becomes unimportant; the will of the people, if it contradicts the will of God, is simply wrong, and should be suppressed rather than enacted.

This attitude of religious identity is reinforced in the Muslim world by the proximity of Israel, which has served to highlight the unity of Muslim Arab states through their opposition to the Jewish homeland. Since the inception of Israel, surrounding Arab states have declared it to be an invasion of lands traditionally theirs, and so there have been ongoing wars and disputes to present day.

In 2002, in a conference of Arab states, the Arab Peace initiative, while a positive step forward, still focused on a full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon. This external focus has served to set many Arab nations in a constant state of military readiness, and is not conducive to softening positions or the acceptance of internal political or religious diversity.

However, since most of the governments in the Middle East are not theocracies, they are not completely determined by religious beliefs and goals. Israel is perhaps the best example of this, as its society, while still containing powerful religious groups, is more secular than many of its Muslim neighbors.

As a result or religious influence, when democracy is attempted, a hybrid emerges which combines Western-style secular politics with religious and ethnic traditional roles and identities. In most nations there are formal ties between the dominant religion and the government. In these instances, religious values and public policy inevitably overlap.

Catholic nations, for instance, are less likely to have liberal abortion policies, just as Islamic governments enforce strict moral codes. Churches that systematically teach values may be at odds with the controlling political system -- as in the conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and secular governments in Algeria or Egypt. So, it seems as if the secularizing force that is democracy, in such a situation, can actually alienate groups within the larger political structure, leading to a cluster of positions and conflicts which appear even more difficult to solve.

However, this does have the effect of showing that the nations which are built on a common identity are actually, whether they acknowledge it or not, really collections of smaller groups who agree on large issues but differ over so many particulars that grouping them together on the basis of shared identity becomes a problem.

This seems like a very difficult situation, but as political analyst Barry Rubin optimistically points out:

..the communal factor can also act as a force that makes democracy more viable.…. If and when these large parties and groups begin to grasp that they will need to make deals among themselves in order for each to have the best chance of securing its own interests, the temptation to grasp after total power will become less intense and the pluralism and tolerance that representative government requires will take root.

When the various groups involved in the competition for governance of any state realize that the others cannot simply be dominated into submission, tolerance will grow out of necessity, and the monolithic idea of a single national identity based on ethnicity or religion will fade into the background.

As we noted in the case of Arab opposition to Israel, Iraq is significantly affected by a powerful internal force which opposes the imposition of Western values over traditional values and practices. Even though many Iraqis believe that their conditions of living may improve in the post-Hussein era of American stewardship, there is a strong resistance to losing or compromising values that have guided them, for better or worse, throughout history.

As a result, the American efforts to help Iraq achieve democracy have looked more like American efforts to impose democracy, which is exactly how the resistance movements in Iraq have characterized the situation. As Cheryl Van Den Handel remarks, “The first difficulty in implementing a ‘Marshall Plan’ under the original program’s rules is the lack of ability of the Iraqi people to take the initiative in owning and implementing such a recovery program.”

Because of entrenched and complex notions of national identity which are often completely opposed to Western beliefs and practices, Iraq’s transition to democracy will require a lot of pushing from the US if it is to take hold, and even then there are no guarantees.

The prospects for Democracy for a Palestinian state look somewhat more favorable than for Iraq. The governing party Hamas, as Lewis W. Snider et al. inform us,

...has proven itself a disciplined adherent to the ceasefire, to the point where Israeli military officers willingly credit this for the sharp decline in violence. In recent statements Hamas leaders have not ruled out changing the movement’s charter, negotiating with Israel, or accepting a long-term truce on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

It is a case of leading a horse to water and making him drink versus the horse getting thirsty and going to the lake himself. Iraq is being dragged toward democracy, while Palestine (if we may call it that) is seeing the advantages of becoming more open and democratic for itself. It is important that the US is able to help Iraq see how it will benefit, and be its own boss. If we can achieve democracy in Iraq, prospects for democracy in other Middle Eastern states will increase exponentially.

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chasem   |2008-03-20 11:45:42 very well written Reply 0   0

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3.25 Copyright (C) 2007 Alain Georgette / Copyright (C) 2006 Frantisek Hliva. All rights reserved."